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OBESITY, CANADA'S "ONE PASSENGER ONE FARE"
RULE AND THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON THE
U.S. COMMERCIAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY
AVERY WILLIAMS*
INTRODUCTION
"[A] fat person variously symbolizes loss of control, a rever-
sion to infantile desires, failure, self-loathing, sloth, passivity and
gluttony."1
O BESITY IS OFTEN cited as one of the last "acceptable" big-
otries.2 Although racism and sexism are not only socially
taboo, but actually illegal in most cases, there is virtually no pro-
tection in the United States against obesity discrimination.3
Likewise, unlike other conditions that attract bigotry, the obese
are continually blamed for their maligned status.4 Anti-obesity
sentiment is nothing new. Even in the early nineties, the media
noticed America's contempt for the obese.5 Moreover, though
political correctness may have dulled anti-obesity rhetoric over
the past fifteen years, even modern commentators have gone so
far as to suggest a special fat-tax for the alleged strain that obese
people cause on the economy and healthcare system.6
*J.D. Candidate 2010 Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.A. 1997, Trinity University. The author would like to thank his wife and
daughter for their love and support.
Natalie Angier, Why So Many Ridicule the Overweight, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 1992,
at 32.
2 See, e.g., Resist Racism, The Last Acceptable Prejudice, http://resistracism.word
press.com/2008/04/15/theast-acceptable-prejudice (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
S See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000 & Supp. V);
Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000 & Supp. V) (in light
of EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc 463 F.3d 436, 443 (2006)); Air Carrier Ac-
cess Act 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2000 & Supp. V).
4 See e.g., William Saletan, Obesity, Laxity, and Political Correctness, SLATE, Jul. 26,
2007, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2171214/.
5 Angier, supra note 1.
6 Giles Coren, Shouldn't We Tax Fatties?, MAIL ONLINE, May 27, 2006, available at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-388001/Shouldnt-tax-fatties.html.
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Commercial air travel is no stranger to the obesity contro-
versy. Ask any "skinny" person, and they will likely have a story
about the miserable flight they once had sitting next to an over-
weight passenger. Ask a severely overweight person how they
feel about flying, and you just might get tears.7 But not in Ca-
nada, at least not anymore. On November 20, 2008, the Cana-
dian Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal of a regulatory
decision that created the "one person one fare" (1PiF) rule,
granting some obese people the right to two seats for the price
of one, effectively making IP1F the law in Canada.' Part I of this
article will briefly examine the state of obesity bias in the west-
ern world. Part II will examine the history of the IPIF rule, and
the statutory and policy arguments behind it. Part III will then
show how American anti-discrimination laws generally do not
protect against discrimination. It will demonstrate how neither
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act,
nor the Air Carrier Access Act explicitly include protections
against obesity discrimination, and how any implied protections
are highly attenuated. Part IV will conclude the article with the
reasons why United States law is unlikely to include anything
resembling Canada's 1P1F rule in the near future, and argue
that it would actually be improper to do so.
I. THE OBESITY BIAS
As obesity rates have risen, anti-obesity prejudice has risen as
well. 9 The National Institutes of Health (NIH) defines obesity
as a body mass index (BMI) of 30 or greater.' 0 At six-feet tall,
one is obese at 221 pounds." At five foot five, one is obese at
7 Vincente Arenas, Too Fat To fly? Man Forced To Buy Extra Seat On Southwest
Flight, KHOU.coM, Sept. 15, 2007, available at http://www.khou.com/topstories/
stories/khou070914_tj fatflyer.d509641b.html.
8 Reuters, Obese have right to two airline seats, Nov. 20, 2008, available at http://
www.reuters.com/article/rbssAirlines/idUSN2039776920081120.
9 National Association'to Advance Fat Acceptance, The Issues, available at http:/
/www.naafaonline.com/dev2//the_issues/index.html (last visited Aug. 15,
2009). Of course, the increase in obesity bigotry may also be due to the increase
in the number of obese people available to discriminate against or an increased
willingness to report obesity discrimination.
10 Department of Health and Human Services-National Institutes for Health,
Calculate Your BMI, http://www.nhlbisupport.com/bmi (last visited Aug. 15,
2009).
11 Department of Health and Human Services-National Institutes for Health,
Executive Summary BMI Chart, http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/
bmi-tbl.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
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180 pounds.12 The percentage of Americans considered obese
grew from 15% in 1980 to 32% in 2004." According to the Na-
tional Association to Advance Fat Acceptance, 7% of U.S. adults
reported weight discrimination in 1995-96, and that rate almost
doubled to 12% by 2006.14 Yet even as America grows ever
larger, there is perhaps no physical malady that elicits as much
open scorn as being fat. The idea of obesity as a lifestyle choice,
as opposed to an ascribed status, seems to fuel the majority of
anti-obesity sentiment. 5 Of course, as obesity rates in the west-
ern world continue to rise, there are organizations that lobby for
and defend the rights of the obese.16 There are also educational
and lobbying organizations working to promote the social ac-
ceptance of obesity.' 7 Like a modern-day Black Like Me' 8 experi-
ment, one celebrity even donned a Hollywood fat-suit to
experience obesity first hand, and then reported back to the rest
of the fit world on just how bad the stigma truly is. 9 It is within
this context of open bigotry and increasing prevalence of obes-
ity that the Canadian Transportation Agency instituted the "one
passenger one fare" rule, which requires that carriers provide an
extra seat for free to those passengers who are "disabled by obes-
ity." To understand the Canadian ruling, and how it might in-
fluence American policy, we must first understand the ruling's
context.
12 Id.
13 Centers for Disease Control, Table 74, Overweight, Obesity, and Healthy
Weight Among Persons 20 Years of Age and Over, by Sex, Age, Race and His-
panic Origin, and Poverty Level: United States, 1960-1962 through 2001-2004,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus7.pdf#074.
14 National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance, supra note 9.
15 See Coren, supra note 6.
16 There is actually a cottage legal industry surrounding obesity, for example,
the Obesity Law and Advocacy Center, which represents obese clients in insur-
ance and employment matters, among other things. See generally Obesity Law and
Advocacy Center, http://vww.obesitylaw.com/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
17 See, e.g., the National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance, supra note 9.
is BLACK LiKE ME is a nonfiction book by John Howard Griffin published in
1961. Mr. Griffin, a white man, died his skin black and posed as a black man
while traveling across the racially-segregated south. The book is an account of his
experiences.
19 Tyra Banks Experiences Obesity Through Fat Suit, Nov. 4, 2005, ABC NEws,
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/BeautySecrets/story?id=1280787.
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II. THE CANADA TRANSPORTATION ACT AND THE
CANADIAN TRANSPORTATION AGENCY
Canadians are deeply serious about transportation accessibil-
ity. The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed "that the ac-
cessible transportation provisions of the [Canada
Transportation Act] are, in essence, human rights legislation. 2 °
The Canadian Transportation Agency (the Agency) is a quasi-
judicial governmental branch empowered with both judicial and
investigatory capabilities. 21 The Canada Transportation Act
(CTA) provides the guidelines under which the Agency shapes
the legal and regulatory framework of the Canadian transit sys-
tem.22 Among other duties, the CTA charges the Agency with
"eliminating undue obstacles in the transportation network"
that hinder the mobility of people with disabilities.23  The
Agency may investigate potential undue obstacles and has the
power to remedy any undue obstacles it finds with monetary
awards, specific performance orders, or both.24
Aside from investigatory and regulatory functions, the Agency
also serves as a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal.25 Cana-
dian citizens may file applications with the Agency claiming that
a given practice of one of Canada's transportation companies
creates an undue obstacle that hinders the mobility of people
with disabilities.26 The Agency will first determine if there is any
obstacle to people with disabilities, and if so, it will then decide
if the obstacle is "undue.''2 v In weighing "undueness," the re-
spondent in an accessibility case must show that it would be un-
reasonable, impracticable, or impossible to remove the obstacle
without suffering undue hardship. 28 It is important to note that
the Agency cannot modify or add to the CTA.29 As an adminis-
20 Norman Estate v. Air Canada, [2008] CarswellNat 1633, 3 (Can. Transp.
Agency).
21 Id. at 1.
22 Canada Transportation Act, R.S.C. ch. 10 § 7(1) (1996).
23 Id. at § 170(1).
24 Id. at §§ 170(1), (3), 174.
25 Norman Estate v. Air Canada, [2008] CarswellNat 1633, 1 (Can. Transp.
Agency).
26 See generally McKay-Panos, Re, [2002] CarswellNat 5523 (Can. Transp.
Agency).
27 Norman Estate v. Air Canada, [2008] CarswellNat 1633, 2 (Can. Transp.
Agency).
28 Id. at 9.
2 McKay-Panos, Re [2002], CarswellNat 5523, 27 (Can. Transp. Agency).
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trative tribunal, the Agency must take the CTA at face value and
may not engraft additional law.3 °
A. THE ROAD TO 1PIF
1. The Calgary Decision
To act under § 172 of the CTA and order corrective measures
for "undue obstacles," "the Agency must be satisfied that: 1.
there is a person with a disability, 2. this person encountered an
obstacle, and 3. this obstacle was undue."31 The groundwork for
obesity's inclusion in the first requirement was laid out in what
is now called the "Calgary Decision" in 2001. The Calgary Deci-
sion resulted from a complaint bought by Linda McKay-Panos
regarding her assigned seat on an Air Canada flight between
Calgary and Ottawa in August of 1997.32 When Ms. Panos made
her initial reservations, the agent assigned her to a bulkhead
seat in lieu of having her purchase two economy seats or a busi-
ness-class seat because, according to the agent, the bulkhead
seats had the most room.13 Ms. Panos was extremely uncomfort-
able during her trip, and moved to an available business class
seat for the second leg of her outbound trip. 4 Although she
was unable to change seats for the first leg of her return trip, she
purchased a business class ticket for the second leg as well. 5
The Calgary Decision began with the conclusion that the
transportation access provisions of the CTA are actually "human
rights legislation aimed at removing undue obstacles to the mo-
bility of persons with disabilities in Canada's transportation sys-
tem." 6  As to human rights, the Agency found that the
accessibility provisions of the CTA should be given a "broad, lib-
eral, and purposive interpretation. 37
The Agency began its investigation into obesity as a disability
by adopting the World Health Organization's International
Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) defini-
tion of "disability" as a useful tool for the determination of the
3 Id.
3' Id. at 26.
32 McKay-Panos v. Air Canada, [2001] CarswellNat 4502 1 (Can. Transp.
Agency).
33 McKay-Panos, Re, [2002] CarswellNat 5523, 9 (Can. Transp. Agency).
34 Id. at 11.
35 Id. at 11.
36 McKay-Panos v. Air Canada, [2001] CarswellNat 4502 169 (Can. Transp.
Agency).
37 Id. at 1 170.
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existence of a "disability" under Part V of the CTA.38 The
Agency then analyzed obesity on the ICF disability dimensions
of "impairment," "activity limitation," and "participation restric-
tion;" and then it made six key findings regarding whether or
not obesity is a disability under the CTA: (1) whether or not
obesity is a disease does not determine whether it is a disability;
(2) there must be an impairment for there to be a disability; (3)
impairment alone is not sufficient to make obesity a disability;
(4) "obese persons do not necessarily experience activity limita-
tions and/or participation restrictions in the context of the fed-
eral transportation network;" (5) for an obese person to be
disabled, they must experience an activity limitation or partici-
pation restriction; and (6) fact-based evidence of an activity limi-
tation or participation restriction is necessary to prove that an
obese person has a disability.39 Under those guidelines, the
CTA found that obesity was not a per se disability, but that there
may be obese people who have a disability attributable to their
obesity.40 The Agency concluded by stating that it would have to
continue to conduct case-by-case investigations into whether
obesity is a disability.41
In finding that obesity can be the cause of a disability, the CTA,
perhaps unknowingly, paved the road to 1P1F. A pivotal, long
standing principle of Canadian transportation accessibility is
that "all persons with disabilities are entitled to be treated in the
same manner regardless of the underlying reason for their disa-
bility. '42 Simply stated, the underlying cause of the disability is
unimportant.4 3 Thus, if a traveler has trouble walking, theoreti-
cally, it would not matter whether the cause was a missing leg or
morbid obesity. Additionally, it does not seem to matter
whether the disability is ascribed to or the result of voluntary
activity. Therefore, even if the American sentiment is right, and
most obese people are simply making a lifestyle choice, they
could still be considered disabled under the application of this
principle. This issue of causation would arise again, and would
prove a critical factor in the 1P1F policy, and a crucial differen-
tiator between Canadian and U.S. jurisprudence.
38 Id. at 186.
39 Id. at 205.
40 Id. at 206.
41 Id. at 207.




2. Stuffing the Genie Back In the Bottle: Revisiting Air Travel
and Obesity
Having determined that obesity may be a disability under the
CTA, the Agency continued its analysis in 2002 with the McKay-
Panos case, investigating whether Ms. McKay-Panos herself actu-
ally had an obesity-related disability for purposes of Part V of the
CTA.44 The "Analysis and Findings" section of the decision be-
gins with a review of the purpose of the CTA.4 5 The Agency
noted that although the purpose of the CTA is to make the
transportation system accessible to disabled people, the accessi-
bility is not meant to be unlimited, requiring the removal only
of avoidable, undue obstacles.46 The Agency then continues to
specify that although the ICF definition of disability was a "use-
ful tool" in determining whether or not a person is disabled
under Part V of the CTA, that the ICF definition is too broad
and overly inclusive.47 Accepting the ICF definition would in-
clude all obese people as disabled under the CTA, a result al-
ready rejected in the Calgary Decision.4"
Having set a formal tone, the Agency continued to narrow its
previous holding. After defining a narrower scope for the pur-
pose of the CTA, and rejecting the ICF definition of disability as
a standalone-test, the Agency explained that it is required to fol-
low a linear, three-step process in determining whether it may
take corrective measures under the Part V of the CTA.49 These
steps, taken in order are that "1. There is a person with a disa-
bility; 2. This person encountered an obstacle; and 3. This the
obstacle was undue."5 Adhering rigidly to the three-step pro-
cess, the Agency excluded information about Ms. McKay-Panos's
discomfort in the seat when deciding whether or not she had a
disability.51 Explaining their reasoning, the Agency noted that
considering the seat in the first stage "requires the Agency,
when assessing the disability of a person, to focus on the obsta-
cle, namely the seat. '52 The Agency explained that such an ap-
proach disregarded the three-step process, which required the
44 McKay-Panos, Re, [2002] CarswellNat 5523, 8 (Can. Transp. Agency).
45 Id. at 21-22.
46 Id. at 23.
47 Id. at 34.
48 Id. at 33.
49 Id. at 26.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 34-35.
52 Id. at 34.
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Agency to consider the obstacle at stage two, not stage one."
The Agency continued, "[i]t is not the obstacle that makes a
person deaf, blind or paraplegic and the Agency does not agree
that it should be different in the case of obesity."54 This line of
reasoning placed Ms. McKay-Panos, and arguably all obese
would-be plaintiffs, in an apparent catch-22. Under the Calgary
Decision, applicants are required to provide fact-based evidence
of activity limitations and participation restrictions.55 However,
the Agency had excluded all evidence regarding the obstacle
(the seat) from the analysis.56 Applicants were therefore pre-
cluded from using evidence of the limiting or restricting item to
prove that there was a limitation or restriction. The Agency
then found no evidence of a disability and dismissed Ms. McKay-
Panos' application.
The same three-member panel decided both the 2001 Calgary
Decision and the subsequent 2002 McKay-Panos holding.58 How-
ever, there is a clear difference in tone and result between the
two decisions. The Calgary Decision used sweeping language;
created a general, open-ended test for obesity-disability; and ele-
vated transportation access to a basic human right.59 Contrast
that with the limiting language, backpedaling, and reversion to
a technicality in the subsequent decision, and one begins to sus-
pect that the Agency realized that it may have let a genie out of
its bottle, and was trying to stuff it back in. However, Ms. McKay-
Panos would not be deterred, and appealed the CTA decision to
the Canadian Federal Court of Appeals, which eventually heard
the case in 2006, because of Air Canada's bankruptcy, which was
not lifted until September 2004.60
3. The Federal Court Weighs In: McKay-Panos, Re
The sole issue on appeal was whether the Agency's holding
was proper when they determined that an obstacle could not be
considered in determining whether there is a person with a disa-
53 Id.
- Id.
55 McKay-Panos v. Air Canada, [2001] CarswellNat 4502 205 (Can. Transp.
Agency).
56 McKay-Panos, Re, [2002] CarswellNat 5523, 1 33 (Can. Transp. Agency).
57 Id. at 1 38, 40.
58 McKay-Panos v. Air Canada, [2006] FCA 8, 1 23 (Can.).
59 See generally McKay-Panos v. Air Canada, [2001] CarswellNat 4502 205
(Can. Transp. Agency).
6 McKay-Panos v. Air Canada, [2006] FCA 8, 25 (Can.).
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bility.61 Although the legal battle was now nine years old, Ms.
McKay-Panos was no longer alone. The Council of Canadians
with Disabilities (CCD) was involved in a case for Joanne Neu-
bauer and Eric Norman, arguing for 1P1F for disabled people
and intervened in Ms. McKay-Panos' federal appeals case, sub-
mitting a brief on disability as applied to the CTA.62 The Fed-
eral Court quickly concluded that the Agency erred when
refusing to consider evidence of the obstacle in determining
whether a person has a disability.63 The court held that there
was no basis for concluding that considering the obstacle at the
disability stage would prevent or disrupt the consideration of the
obstacle later in the process. 64 Since an obstacle is only ulti-
mately relevant if it is "undue," the court reasoned that consid-
ering an obstacle's mere existence as part of the disability
determination would not disrupt the later determination of
whether the obstacle is "undue."65
Progressing with a common sense approach, the court con-
cluded that the Agency had effectively removed all contextual
evidence from the inquiry into whether a person has a disabil-
ity, 6 6 and that arguably there can be no disability without a con-
textual frame of reference. 67 Having highlighted the error of
the Agency, the court remanded the case for the Agency's re-
view of whether Ms. McKay-Panos, as a disabled person, encoun-
tered an undue obstacle.68 Towards the end of the discussion,
the Court of Appeals delivered an interesting sentence that
would later be quoted by the Agency in the iP1F decision:
In this regard, the relative ease with which the existence of a disa-
bility can be established at the first stage should not be construed
as preventing the Agency from having regard to all relevant con-
siderations at the undue obstacle stage of the analysis including,
for instance, etiology if it is shown to be relevant.6 9
By focusing on the etiology (causation) of the disability in the
undue obstacle, the appeals court apparently invited the Agency
61 Id. at 1 32.
62 Meiname, Healthy of You and Me, The End (Beginning?) of a longJourney:
Disability and air travel, Jan. 6, 2009, http://meiname.com/article/gender/2009-
01-06/21888.html.
63 McKay-Panos v. Air Canada, [2006] FCA 8, 1 37 (Can.).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1 39.
- Id.
67 Id. at 1 40.
6 Id. at 1 45.
69 Id. at 1 44.
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to consider the cause and, on related grounds, perhaps the mu-
tability of the disability in determining whether the obstacle is
"undue. ' v So, although the court of appeals swung the "disabil-
ity" door wide open, they left a potential screen for the "undue
obstacle" portion of the test.71 In 2008, the Agency would de-
cide once and for all how that language would play out for
obese airline passengers.
B. THE 1PIF RULING
1. The Demands
In what is perhaps a rare example of judicial economy, after
hearing Ms McKay-Panos' case, the Agency elected to add obes-
ity to the issues being decided in the pending Neubauer and
Norman case.7 2 Ms. McKay-Panos intervened in that case to re-
present the specific issue of undue obstacles for persons dis-
abled by obesity. 73 Ms. McKay-Panos's case was no longer
limited to obesity, but now encompassed all disabled people
who need more than one seat when flying.7 The applicants re-
quested that: (1) anyone with a disability who is required by the
carrier to travel with an attendant gets a free seat for the attend-
ant; (2) any person "disabled by obesity" and who "cannot lower
the armrest of the seat assigned safely and with dignity" be given
a second, adjacent seat for free, or an upgrade to a larger seat
for free; and (3) free additional seating for anyone with a disa-
bility who needs extra seating.75 The applicants also requested
that no airport improvement fees be added to the additional
seats provided by the carriers.76
2. The Issues
By this point, the question of whether or not obesity could
qualify as a disability was settled. The previous McKay-Panos
cases cleared the way for obesity to be a disability under the CTA
by a case-by-case factual analysis in light of the challenges faced
by the person when traveling.77 All that remained, per the Fed-
70 Id.
71 See id.
72 Meiname, supra note 62.
73 Norman Estate v. Air Canada, [2008] CarswellNat 1633, 41 (Can. Transp.
Agency).
74 Id. at 41-43.
- Id. at 1 2.
76 Id.
77 McKay-Panos v. Air Canada, [2006] FCA 8, 40 (Can.).
672
eral Court of Appeal's holding in McKay-Panos, Re was to deter-
mine whether there was an obstacle, and if so, whether the
obstacle was "undue. 78
3. The Decision
The Agency began their obstacle discussion by stating the ele-
ments for a prima facie case that an obstacle exists at all in the
context of the CTA. The three elements for CTA obstacles are:
"[(1)] a distinction, exclusion or preference resulted in an ob-
stacle to the mobility of a person with a disability; [(2)] the ob-
stacle was related to the person's disability; and [(3)] the
obstacle discriminates by imposing a burden upon, or withhold-
ing a benefit from[,] a person with a disability. ' 79 After a brief
discussion, the Agency concluded that requiring disabled peo-
ple to purchase additional tickets constitutes an obstacle to their
travel.8 ° Indeed, having to pay twice as much for air travel ap-
pears an easy candidate for an "obstacle" to travel.
The Agency then devoted considerable space to the discus-
sion of whether the required additional tickets are "undue hard-
ships. '  Again, the Agency recited a three-step approach.82
After the applicant has made out a prima facie case of an obsta-
cle, the burden shifts to the respondent to prove, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that: (1) the obstacle is rationally
connected to a legitimate objective; (2) the obstacle was
adopted by the carrier with a good faith belief that it was neces-
sary; and (3) the obstacle is reasonably necessary for the accom-
plishment of its objective such that the carrier cannot
accommodate the person without suffering undue hardship. 8
The carrier must show that it has provided reasonable accom-
78 Norman Estate v. Air Canada, [2008] CarswellNat 1633, 128 (Can. Transp.
Agency).
79 Id. at 138. For reference, the accessibility provision of the Americans with
Disabilities Act states "Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities
of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000 & Supp. V). The key
difference between Canadian and American policy for our purposes is the accept-
ance of obesity as a disability.
80 Norman Estate v. Air Canada, [2008] CarswellNat 1633, 170 (Can. Transp.
Agency).
81 Id. at 171.
82 Id. at 172.
83 Id.
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modations to the disabled person up to the point of undue
hardship on the carrier.84 Undue hardship is determined
through a balancing test between the interest of the disabled,
and the interests of the carrier in light of the circumstances of
the case.85 The test includes such considerations as the severity
of the obstacle, how frequently it occurs, and the carrier's com-
mercial, economic, and operational considerations.8 6 To show
undue hardship, the carrier must show "that there are no rea-
sonable alternatives to better accommodate the person with a
disability" and that the removal of the obstacle is unreasonable,
impracticable, or impossible.87
The Agency concluded that, regarding the additional ticket
purchase requirements, the airlines easily met the first two ele-
ments: (1) a rational relationship between the obstacle (the ad-
ditional fare) and a legitimate business objective, and (2) the
adoption of the obstacle in good faith.88 The remaining issue
then was whether the requested relief, that is, 1P1F, would be an
undue hardship on the carriers.89 The carriers raised three
main objections, safety, cost, and operational constraints.90
The safety argument raised by the carrier did not address
obesity, but rather focused on travelers who need an attendant
while flying.9' The carriers focused on the applicants' conten-
tion that the airline, for safety reasons, requires some passengers
to have attendants. 92 The carrier suggested that the most inclu-
sive measure would be to simply drop the requirement, leaving
the passenger free to decide whether they need an attendant or
not.93 However, as eliminating the requirement would create an
unreasonable safety concern, the carriers concluded that no rea-
sonable accommodation was possible.94 The Agency quickly dis-
missed the carrier's argument as misstating the issue, which was
not the imposition of a rule requiring the extra seat, but rather
the fact that the travelers truly do need an extra seat due to their
84 Id. at 173.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 9 175.
88 Id. at 1 203-10.
89 Id. at 1 172.
90 Id. at 1 212.





disability, and are being charged more than non-disabled
flyers. 5
The Agency then examined the financial implications of im-
plementing the 1PIF policy.9 6 After an exhaustive review, the
Agency concluded that the lost revenue to Air Canada would be
$7,086,288 and the costs to West Jet would be $1,467,814. 97
These overall numbers equate to per-ticket increased costs of
$0.41 and $0.16 respectively, 98 meaning, for example, that if
every ticket sold by Air Canada was increased by $0.41, they
would cover the costs of the IPIF policy. Expressed in terms of
likely increase in domestic fares, Air Canada would increase a
$244 ticket by $0.77, while West Jet would increase a $140 ticket
by $0.44. 9 The Agency found that costs of this size do not re-
present an undue hardship to the airlines in question. In fact,
the overall cost increase was found to be within the "margin of
error" in terms of general revenue expectations, and would not
have a material impact on the market. 100
The carriers also raised an economic policy argument in that
the 1P1F policy creates a cross-subsidy, where regular travelers
must pay above-market rates so that disabled travelers can pay
below-market rates. 10 ' However, the "marginal" cost increase for
each ticket, and the Canadian view of transport accessibility as a
basic human right apparently satisfied the Agency that a cross
subsidy was an acceptable remedy for a transportation obsta-
cle. 10 2 The Agency also noted a number of positive economic
effects, including greater ability for disabled persons to travel
for work. 10 3
The Agency next discussed the operational constraints of im-
plementing the 1PiF policy.104 From an obesity perspective, the
question was how to determine when someone is too large to
reasonably fit in a single seat. 105 The carriers argued that, for a
number of reasons, such a determination would be impossible
95 Id. at 217-19. All in Canadian dollars.
96 Id. at 220.
97 Id. at 701.
98 Id.
- Id. at 712.
100 Id. at 828.
101 Id. at 1 723-27.
102 Id. at 741-42.
103 Id. at 1 744.
104 Id. at 1 830.
105 Id. at 1 862.
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to administer. 10 6 First, the carriers argued that although they
may be able to provide accommodation to obese people at the
airport on the day of travel, on an ad hoc basis and if load factors
permit, that it would be unreasonable to expect them to set up a
screening process to determine in advance whether someone is
too big for a single seat.107 The carriers also argued that "fit"
and "comfort" are subjective characterizations that would be dif-
ficult if not impossible to objectively test, and that many people,
obese or otherwise, complain about uncomfortable airline
seats."' Strikingly, the Canadian carriers' undoing came from
an American company-Southwest Airlines. 109 Southwest Air-
lines' "Customers of Size" policy simply states that if a passenger
cannot lower the armrest, they must buy an extra seat.1 0 The
Agency noted that Southwest seems to have been able to opera-
tionalize a test to determine if customers are too big for a single
seat; so, Air Canada and West Jet should be able to do the
same.
11
Having dispensed with the carrier's undue hardship objec-
tions, the Agency reiterated a number of policy arguments it
held as crucial to the holding.' 1 2 Among these arguments was
that "all persons with disabilities are entitled to be treated in the
same manner regardless of the underlying reason for their disa-
bility."'1 3 Here, the Agency returned to the enticing "etiology"
clause included in the McKay-Panos court of appeals case." 4 Al-
though the Agency recognized that it had the ability to consider
causation of the disability in the analysis of "undue obstacles,"
they determined that such a consideration would be inconsis-
tent with the non-causational equality policy argument, and it
was therefore improper to include in the analysis. 15
Having found that people with disabilities were encountering
undue obstacles, the Agency laid down its order for corrective
measure, forbidding the carriers from charging additional fares
106 Id.
107 Id. at 861.
108 Id. at 862-63.
109 Id. at 879.
110 Southwest Airlines Travel Policies-Customer of Size Q&A, http://www.
southwest.com/travel_center/cos-qa.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
111 See Norman Estate v. Air Canada, [2008] CarswellNat 1633, 879 (Can.
Transp. Agency).
112 Id. at 894.
113 Id. at 898.
114 Id. at 898-99.
115 Id. at 898.
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for seats provided to: (1) people required by the airlines to fly
with an attendant; (2) people disabled by obesity; and (3) peo-
ple who otherwise need additional seating because of their disa-
bility.1"6 The Agency gave the carriers twelve months to
implement this rule, setting a January 10, 2009 deadline.' 1
7
Though carriers appealed, the Federal Court of Appeals denied
the carriers leave to appeal, and the Canadian Supreme Court
finally dismissed the carrier's application for leave to appeal on
November 20, 2008.118
4. Canadian Law at Work: Formal and Functional Analyses Join
for a Milestone Ruling
Note the interplay between the Canadian Federal Court of
Appeals organic, functional use of the three-part undue-obstacle
test, and the Agency's rigid, formal application. The decision by
the Agency that obesity could be a disability'1 9 was quickly extin-
guished by their subsequent, formalistic holding that even
though Ms. McKay-Panos was morbidly obese, she was not dis-
abled under the CTA. 120 In that holding, the Agency listed their
three-part test, and found that it would be improper to consider
the obstacle (stage two and three) at the "disability" (stage one)
stage of the analysis. 21 The Canadian Federal Court of Appeals,
however, applied a less formal approach, and found no reason
that one could not consider the obstacle at the disability stage of
the analysis, and overturned the Agency's decision. 122 The court
of appeals also noted that one could consider the disability (at
least the cause of the disability) at the "undue obstacle" stage,1 23
and even questioned whether the three-part test was really two
parts in disguise.1 24 However, when the Agency re-heard the
obesity arguments, it again performed a formal analysis, ac-
cepting, as it must have, the court of appeals inclusion of the
obstacle in the disability stage, but declining, as it might have, to
116 Id. at 916.
117 Id. at 918-19.
118 CTA, Highlights of One-Person-One-Fare Policy Decision, http://www.cta-
otc.gc.ca/doc.php?did=2168&lang=eng (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
n9 McKay-Panos v. Air Canada, [2001] CarswellNat 4502 1 206-8 (Can.
Transp. Agency).
120 See McKay-Panos v. Air Canada, [2002] CarswellNat 5523, 39 (Can.
Transp. Agency).
121 Id. at 34.
122 McKay-Panos v. Air Canada, [2006] FCA 8, 37 (Can.).
123 Id. at 1 44.
124 See id. at 1 39.
2009] OBESITY 677
678 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
include the cause of the disability in the obstacle stage. 125 Only
through this oscillating functional/formal analysis did the iP1F
policy become approved for all "disabled" obese passengers.
5. Determining Who is Disabled Under IPIF
The Agency's IP1F decision, though certainly a landmark rul-
ing benefiting the obese, leaves the question of who is "disabled
by obesity" unanswered. The Agency left that question to the
airlines, though they did note Southwest Airlines' policy as a
possibility. 126 The airlines, however, chose a different path. In-
stead of implementing any kind of test at the airport, as South-
west Airlines does, the airlines require obese travelers to obtain
a doctor's note attesting to their "disability." 127
Both Air Canada and WestJet's extra seating policy states that
passengers who need an extra seat because they are disabled by
obesity require medical approval for travel. 12  Prospective pas-
sengers must have their physicians fill out and sign a question-
naire detailing the passenger's height, weight, body mass index,
and hip width. 129 After the physician completes and signs the
form, the prospective passenger must book their travel and fax
the form at least forty-eight hours before the trip. 3 ' The carri-
ers then decide whether or not the person qualifies for free ad-
ditional seating, although they do not publish their criteria. 13 1
125 Norman Estate v. Air Canada, [2008] CarswellNat 1633, 899 (Can.
Transp. Agency).
126 Id. at 74.
127 Aircanada.com, Travel Info, http://www.aircanada.com/en/travelinfo/
before/specialneeds.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2009); Westjet.com, Travel Tips,
http://c3dsp.westet.com/guest/travelTips.jsp#oneperson (last visited Aug. 15,
2009).
128 Aircanada.com, Travel Info, http://www.aircanada.com/en/travelinfo/
before/specialneeds.html (last visited June 1, 2009); Westjet.com, Travel Tips,
http://c3dsp.westjet.com/guest/travelTips.jsp#oneperson (last visited Aug. 15,
2009).
129 Air Canada Fitness for Air Travel Medical Information Form, http://www.
aircanada.com/en/travelinfo/before/documents/fft.pdf (last visited Aug. 15,
2009); Westjet Request for Additional Seating, http://www.westjet.com/pdffile/
OPOFFormC en.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
130 Aircanada.com, Travel Info, http://www.aircanada.com/en/travelinfo/
before/specialneeds.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2009); Westjet.com, Travel Tips,
http://c3dsp.westet.com/guest/travelTips.jsp#oneperson (last visited Aug. 15,
2009).
131 Aircanada.com, Travel Info, http://www.aircanada.com/en/travelinfo/
before/specialneeds.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2009); Westjet.com, Travel Tips,
http://c3dsp.westjet.com/guest/travelTips.jsp#oneperson (last visited Aug. 15,
2009).
Passengers who are disabled by obesity according to Air Canada
can receive a two-year approval for an additional seat once their
application has been processed. 132 WestJet offers either one-
year approval for passengers with transient disabilities or perma-
nent approval for passengers with disabilities expected to last
their entire lives. 133
To put it plainly, by requiring a doctor to certify that the pro-
spective traveler's size requires more than one seat, the carriers
punted the issue of obesity disability to the medical community.
After all of the discussion about how difficult it would be to de-
cide who is disabled by obesity, the carriers elected to essentially
have someone else decide. What's more, they failed to consult
the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) before launching the
program to all of Canada.13 4 The CMA intends to ask the air-
lines to reconsider their policy. 135
III. OBESITY DISCRIMINATION AND
UNITED STATES LAW
American anti-discrimination law, though firmly rooted in our
culture, is based in commerce rather than human rights.1 36 It
was the federal government's ability to regulate interstate com-
merce that led to the first federal legal challenge to racial dis-
crimination. 37  So while Canada's legal system sees
transportation access as a basic human right, the empowering
legislation for disability equality in U.S. law is not so profound.
Perhaps as a reflection of American attitudes towards obesity,
existing U.S. law offers virtually no protection for the obese.
There are three main anti-discrimination legal frameworks in
the United States that could prohibit discrimination against the
obese: the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabili-
132 Aircanada.com, Travel Info, http://www.aircanada.com/en/travelinfo/
before/specialneeds.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
133 Westjet Request for Additional Seating, http://www.westjet.com/pdffile/
OPOFFormCen.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
134 CMA, Airline Decision on Obesity Ruling Concerns Canada's Doctor,
http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/Canadian-Medical-Association-936
348.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
135 Id.
136 See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
137 See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. 294.
These seminal cases used the federal power to regulate interstate commerce as a
means to forbid discrimination in hotels and restaurants. See generally Heart of
Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241, Katzenbach, 379 U.S. 294.
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ties Act, and the Air Carrier Access Act. For various reasons,
each fails to give the obese the protection they continually seek,
whether trying to get a job or a seat on an airplane. The next
section discusses the state of obesity discrimination law in the
United States and offers some suggestions for potential obesity-
related claims.
A. THE CML RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
The grandfather of modern anti-discrimination law is the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (the 1964 Act). Arguably still the most im-
portant piece of anti-discrimination legislation, Title VII of the
1964 Act (Title VII) addresses an array of discrimination in em-
ployment situations. 138 Title VII prohibits discrimination with
respect to hiring, compensation, terms, conditions, and privi-
leges of employment because of such individual's race, color,
religion, gender, or national origin. 13' Attentive readers may al-
ready notice a problem-the statute does not mention "weight"
anywhere in the list of protected classes. 140 Title VII simply does
not address direct obesity discrimination.' 4' Thus, while you
cannot be fired for being black or Asian, and you cannot be
paid less because you are a woman or a Muslim, you can, under
Title VII, be paid less, be fired, be forced to office in the base-
ment, or be otherwise discriminated against because you are
fat. 142
1. Disparate Impact-Introduction
The type of intentional discrimination described above is
termed "disparate treatment," and arises when an employer in-
tentionally treats one class of people differently than another.1
4 3
However, there is another type of discrimination, originally judi-
cially engrafted into Title VII,' 44 and later codified in the 1991
amendments to the 1964 Act, called "disparate impact."'45 The
1991 amendments made it clear that not only were employers
1- See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000 & Supp. V).
139 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
143 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
-4 George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REv. 1297, 1297 (1987).
145 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Historical and Statutory Notes,
Purposes of the 1991 Amendments § 3 (2000 & Supp. V).
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prohibited from directly discriminating against protected classes
of employees, but that in many situations, employers would also
be prohibited from adopting facially neutral policies and prac-
tices that disparately impact one or more protected classes. 46 A
textbook example of disparate impact is Dothard v. Rawlinson,
the Alabama prison guard case, where the Court struck down
prison guard height and weight requirements because they had
a disparate impact across gender. '47 So even though height and
weight are not protected classes under Title VII, people who are
discriminated against on the basis of height, weight, or any
other characteristic may have a cause of action if the discrimina-
tory policy impacts a protected class. 148
Modern commentators are already considering how disparate
impact claims may apply to obesity discrimination.' 49 According
to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics, obesity is particularly preva-
lent in black/African American women.1 50 The 2004 data shows
that although the overall, national obesity rate for people aged
20 and over is 31.4%; 51.6% of black/African American women
are obese-a 19.3% difference.' 51 Obesity may not be a pro-
tected class, but race and gender are both protected under the
1964 Act. So it may be possible to make a disparate impact ra-
cial and/or gender discrimination case based on obesity dis-
crimination policies.152
2. The Elements of a Disparate Impact Claim
To make a prima facie case for disparate impact claims under
Title VII of the 1964 Act, the plaintiff must show that a policy of
the employer discriminates against a particular protected
M 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
147 433 U.S. 321, 328-32 (1977). According to the Court, the height and
weight requirements included roughly 99.76% of men and 58.87% of women,
showing a clear disparate impact between genders. Id. at n.12.
148 See id.
149 See, e.g., Monica DiBianca, The Link Between Race & Obesity: Disparate Impact
Waiting to Happen?, DEL. EMP. L. BLOC, Apr. 29, 2008, available at http://www.
delawareemploymentlawblog.com/2008/04/thelinkbetweenraceobesity.
html; SAYWARD B. STUART, The Penalty for Fatness: Obesity discrimination and the
Traditional Civil Rights Approach, GetLegal, AUG. 26, 2008, available at http://pub-
lic.getlegal.com/articles/obesity-discrimination.
150 See Centers for Disease Control, supra note 13.
15, Id.
152 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 338-41 (1977).
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class. 53 One rule of thumb detailed in the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations for establishing
disparate impact is the "80% rule." '154 "A selection rate for any
race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or
eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate
will generally be regarded by the federal enforcement agencies
as evidence of adverse impact.115 5 This means that if some pro-
gram, through various criteria, selects 50% of Caucasians for
some benefit, but only 39% of a given ethnic minority, then the
statistics support a finding of disparate impact.1 56 Taking the
inverse of the obesity numbers above, 67.7% of the overall popu-
lation is not obese, while only 48.4% of black/African American
women are not obese. Applying the 80% rule, we see that 48.4%
divided by 67.7% equals 71.5%, meaning that the non-obese se-
lection rate for black/African American women is less than 80%
of the selection rate for the general population, and would
therefore support a disparate impact argument. However,
courts may not actually allow the combination of protected clas-
ses to create new "sub classes." 157 Although race is protected,
and gender is protected, the intersection between race and gen-
der (for example, being a black woman) may not be protected
beyond the protections given to the individual classifications
under separate review. 158
After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to show that the policy is job related, and
a "business necessity.1 59 In the case of obesity, there are a slew
of explanations an employer could conceivably raise depending
on the job in question, from physical activity requirements in
active jobs, to physical attractive preferences in service jobs, to
simple geometric necessity forjobs like an airline steward, which
require working in small spaces. Indeed, weight requirements
for airline employees have even been upheld as grooming stan-
dards, as long as the standard applies equally to both men and
women. 160 Once the employer demonstrates that the policy is
153 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000 & Supp. V).
154 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(d) (2008).
15 Id.
1-56 See id. 39% divided by 50% equals 78%, which is less than the 80% cutoff.
157 See, e.g., Degraffenreid v. GM Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo.
1976), (aff'd in part, rev'd in part, on other grounds); contra Chambers v. Omaha
Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb 1986).
158 Degraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 142.
159 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (2000 & Supp. V).
160 Cox v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 553 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977).
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related to the job, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show
that there is no alternative, non-discriminatory policy that could
accomplish the same goals.161 Thus, it is eventually the plain-
tiff's burden to prove that some criteria other than level of obes-
ity could be used as a criteria by the employer, and that this
other criteria would not also result in disparate racial impact.1 62
3. Title VII Disparate Impact Claims Are Not Ideal For Obesity
Discrimination Litigation
Disparate impact obesity claims are largely uncharted waters.
There are an excessive number of hoops to jump through for
any plaintiff in such an action, including: (1) identifying a policy
that discriminates against the obese; (2) showing that there has
actually been an disparate impact on a protected class; (3) prov-
ing that the obesity-discrimination policy is the cause of that dis-
parate impact; and (4) showing either that there is no rational
business need for such a policy, or that despite the need for
such a policy, an alternative, nondiscriminatory policy exists.1 63
Additionally, in order to actually benefit the obese generally,
and not just the individual plaintiff, the alternative policy must
not be weight-based, and there is little to no guarantee of such
an outcome.
In summary, Title VII provides little hope for obesity discrimi-
nation protection, and is not an appropriate basis for a United
States equivalent to Canada's 1P1F law. Indeed, Title VII ap-
plies only to employment situations, not to customers. 6 4 There
is a separate statute making it a crime to interfere with any per-
son traveling on any common carrier (which includes airlines)
because of the traveler's race, color, religion, or national ori-
gin, 165 but there is no indication as to whether ajudge would be
willing to engraft a disparate impact cause of action onto this
statute as was engrafted onto Title VII of the 1964 Act prior to
the 1991 amendments. In fact, it seems likely that the judiciary
would not choose to engraft a disparate impact cause of action,
since the 1991 amendments were largely a reaction to the 1989
holding in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, which elimi-
161 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (A) (ii).
162 See id.
163 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
164 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
165 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(e) (2006).
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nated the judicially-created Title VII disparate-impact claims. 166
Absent a statutory amendment, Title VII, though a stalwart
workhorse of anti-discrimination law, is unlikely to result in gen-
eral relief against obesity discrimination.
B. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities."' 6 7 There are both employment 16 and access16 9 pro-
visions to the ADA. The access provisions do not apply to air-
lines,17° however, which are instead covered by the Air Carrier
Access Act (ACAA).
1. The Elements of an ADA Claim
The employment provisions of the ADA follow a familiar, bur-
den shifting method of proof similar to Title VII cases.'71 Un-
like Title VII, an employee litigating disability discrimination
under the ADA must show that they are able to perform the
essential elements of the job. 172 If the plaintiff succeeds in that
showing, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a non-
discriminatory reason for the treatment.1 73 The plaintiff must
then prove that the non-discriminatory reason is a mere pretext
for intentional discrimination.1 74
For the purposes of the ADA, "[t]he term 'disability' means,
with respect to an individual- (A) a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activ-
ities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such impairment.1' 75 To be "re-
garded as" having a disability, the discriminator must have a mis-
conception about the individual presumed to be disabled. 176
166 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Historical and Statutory Notes, Congressional Findings &
Purposes of 1991 Amendments (2000 & Supp. V).
167 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(1).
168 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111-12117.
169 See 42 U.S.C. § 12131-12165.
170 42 U.S.C. § 12181(10).
171 Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.1 (2003).
172 42 U.S.C. 12111(8).
173 Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 50 n.3.
174 Id.
175 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
176 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (overruled on
other grounds).
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The discriminating party must wrongfully believe either that
"one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not
have," or alternatively, "that one has a substantially limiting im-
pairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting." '177
The ADA statute does not define "substantially limits" or "major
life activities," but the EEOC has outlined a number of illumi-
nating regulations, ly' though there is still ample room for inter-
pretation. It is this very ambiguity that appeals to potential
obesity-discrimination litigants. Since there is no pre-defined
list of qualifying disabilities, there is the possibility that obesity
could qualify.
2. Cook v. State of Rhode Island, and a Ray of Obesity
Discrimination Hope
Cook v. Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation and
Hospitals is a milestone obesity discrimination case holding that
obesity can be a disability in the United States.' Cook was filed
under the Rehabilitation Act, a set of anti-discrimination laws
that prohibits agencies that receive federal funds from discrimi-
nating against certain disabled employees.' However, the defi-
nition of "disability" is essentially the same in both the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act, and case law from the Rehabilitation Act
cases defining "disability" can apply to ADA cases as well.' 8 1
Bonnie Cook applied to work as a nurse for the Rhode Island
Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals
(MHRH) .112 At five-foot two and three hundred and twenty
pounds, Cook was morbidly obese." 3 Despite her size, Cook was
able to pass her pre-employment physical examination, but was
still not hired. The MHRH claimed that "Cook's morbid obesity
compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of an emer-
gency and put her at greater risk of developing serious ailments
(a 'fact' that MHRH's hierarchs speculated would promote ab-
senteeism and increase the likelihood of workers' compensation
claims)."184 Cook sued under the third prong of the Rehabilita-
177 Id.
178 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2008).
179 See Dennis M. Lynch, The Heavy Issue: Weight-Based Discrimination in the Air-
line Industry, 62J. AIR L. & CoM. 203, 217 (1996).
180 Cook v. R.I. Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation and Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 21
(R.I. C.A. 1993).
81 Nedder v. Rivier College, 908 F. Supp 66, 74 n.7 (D.N.H. 1995).
182 Cook, 10 F.3d at 20.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 21.
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tion Act/ADA definition of disability-that she was regarded as
having a disability.1 15
The Cook court's analysis of the definitions for "major life ac-
tivities" and "substantially limits" is helpful to an understanding
of how it may be possible to apply the ADA to obesity law. The
court first analyzed "major life activities," finding that the defen-
dant's own testimony stated that he believed Cook's obesity di-
minished her ability to walk, bend, stoop, and kneel to the point
that she would be unable to work as a nurse.1 8 6 These are pre-
cisely the kinds of activities covered by the ADA regulations on
"major life activities," which specifically includes "walking. ' 187
The court found that on this basis alone, the jury could have
found that MHRH regarded Cook's obesity as affecting a major
life activity, and thus uphold that portion of the trial court's
findings.' The court then looked at whether the effected "ma-
jor life activities" were substantially limited. 1 9 Noting that the
Rehabilitation Act regulations did not provide any guidance on
the meaning of "substantially limits," the court looked to the
ADA regulations for guidance.1 90 Thus, the court's findings on
the substantiality of the limitations are particularly relevant to
ADA obesity litigation. First, the court states that the degree of
limitation is a question of fact for the jury, and indicates that the
jury's finding would only be overturned if the court found the
evidence was insufficient to support such a finding. 1 ' MHRH
felt that Cook's obesity would preclude her from a wide variety
of healthcare jobs, including "community living aide, nursing
185 Id. at 22.
186 Id. at 25.
187 "Major Life Activities means functions such as caring for oneself, perform-
ing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2008).
188 Cook, 10 F.3d at 25.
189 Id.
190 Id. at n.10. Under the ADA regulations,
[t]he term substantially limits means: (i) [u]nable to perform a ma-
jor life activity that the average person in the general population
can perform; or (ii) [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition,
manner or duration under which an individual can perform a par-
ticular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or
duration under which the average person in the general popula-
tion can perform that same major life activity.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.20). The severity and expected duration of the potential disa-
bility are also considered. Id.
191 See Cook, 10 F.3d at 25.
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home aide, hospital aide, and home health care aide." 19 2 Again,
the judge rather quickly concludes that this statement alone
could have led a reasonable jury to conclude that MHRH re-
garded Cook as substantially disabled.193
At this point, it is important to note the degree of psychologi-
cal speculation inherent in "regarded as" disability litigation.
Recall that Cook's entire cause of action is about speculation-
the opinion of the defendant as to Cook's degree of disability-
not whether she was factually disabled. The court's review can
be summarized as their opinion of the jury's opinion of the de-
fendant's mistaken opinion of the severity of Cook's obesity-re-
lated disability. This is an important point for obesity
discrimination under the ADA, because it underscores how the
shifting tide of public opinion may influence perceived-disability
obesity litigation.19 4 MHRH attempted to raise two defenses that
neatly encapsulate both American obesity bias and modern ob-
stacles to obesity bias legislation: mutability and voluntariness.' 95
There is some conceptual overlap between the concepts of mu-
tability and voluntariness, indeed one usually accompanies the
other. Both "defenses" also reflect the essence of American
obesity bias-if she is disabled because she is fat, it is her own
fault. The court dispenses with each defense in turn.9 6
Though the requirement of immutability appeared in the origi-
nal jury charge, the court, in dicta, found no reason to require
immutability outright. 97 Instead, the court suggested that the
mutability be considered in the severity of the disability, not as a
threshold issue barring a finding of disability at all. 198 However,
since the jury charge had gone without objection, the court con-
tinued its analysis into the mutability of Cook's obesity.199
Though the court did find evidence that the metabolic condi-
tion associated with morbid obesity persists after weight loss,
suggesting immutability, the court noted that in a "regarded as"
192 Id.
193 Id. Under modem ADA litigation, a plaintiff in Cook's situation would
likely claim that an offending employer regarded her as substantially limited in
the major life activity of "working," which neatly fits the defendant's statements
and is also specifically mentioned in the EEOC regulations. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)
(2006).
194 See Cook, 10 F.3d at 25.
195 Id. at 23-24.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 23.
198 Id. at n.7.
199 Id. at 23.
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disability action, it is once again only the perception of the de-
fendant that is at issue.20 Even if immutability were a require-
ment, all the employer would need to do would be to act in a
way that demonstrates that he regards the condition as immuta-
ble.201 Noting that the defendant's own expert testified that it is
dangerous to lose more than twenty percent of your body weight
in a single year, and that MHRH would not have hired the de-
fendant until she weighed less than one hundred and ninety
pounds, the court held that at the very least, a reasonable jury
could have found that MHRH regarded Cook's condition as im-
mutable for the two years it would have taken her to lose that
much weight.20 2
MHRH also argued that because some part of obesity is due to
voluntary behavior, that it cannot be a disability.20 3 In dispens-
ing with this claim, the court noted that nowhere in the defini-
tion of "disability" is there any indication that the cause of the
disability plays a role in deciding whether the disability qualifies
for protection.20 4 Note the similarity here between the Cook
court's dismissal of the importance of causation, and the Cana-
dian Agency's unwillingness to include causation in their analy-
sis of who should qualify for the IPIF program. 20 5 The court
also noted that the original jury instructions had (perhaps erro-
neously) required the jury find that Cook was powerless to con-
trol her condition,20 6 and that there was medical testimony that
Cook's weight was the result of an underlying metabolic and ap-
petite regulation disorder.2 v
Having extinguished all of MHRH's arguments, the court
quickly dispensed with the review of the remaining jury find-
ings.2 ' The court found ample evidence for the jury to have
concluded that Cook was otherwise qualified to act as a nurse, as
she had done so over the past five years and had passed the
screening physical.2 0° Similarly, the court found, as the Rehabil-
itation Act requires, that Cook was refused work solely because
200 Id. at 24.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 24, n.8.
203 Id. at 24.
204 Id.
205 Compare id. to Norman Estate v. Air Canada, [2008] CarswellNat 1633, 4
(Can. Transp. Agency).
206 Cook, 10 F.3d at 24.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 26-28.
2 9 Id. at 20.
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of her disability.210 Indeed, the defendant never suggested any
other reason for their refusal to hire her.
211
3. Cook's Shortcomings, and the "Underlying Physiological Cause"
Requirement
Although Cook seemed to have opened the door for "regarded
as" obesity ADA litigation, it is not without limitations. As subse-
quent cases have noted, Cook is merely confirming a jury's find-
ings under a highly deferential standard of review.212 Cook does
not state that even morbid obesity is always, or even often, a disa-
bility under the ADA.213 Rather, Cook stands for the more lim-
ited idea that under some circumstances, a judge will not
overrule a jury's finding that an employer regarded a morbidly
obese applicant as having a qualifying disability.214 In fact, re-
cent trends seem to indicate that obesity will only be considered
a disability when there is some underlying physiological abnor-
mality that causes the obesity, 215 a trend not contradicted by
Cook, since there was evidence of an underlying physiological
cause to Cook's obesity.216 Indeed, despite Cook's rejection of
mutability and voluntariness, the concepts seem to linger in the
requirement of an underlying physiological cause, which pre-
sumptively works to relieve the obese applicant of both blame
and the ability to correct the condition.
Absent a finding of an underlying physiological cause, an
obese litigant may not survive summary judgment. 2 7 In EEOC v.
Watkins Motor Lines, Inc, a 405-pound truck driver, who was fired
because he was too overweight to safely do his job, lost his ADA
claim on summary judgment, because "non-physiological mor-
bid obesity is not an 'impairment' under the ADA. ' 218 Again,
the facts in Cook do not conflict with this finding.219 The Watkins
court continues by noting that employers are entitled to prefer
some physical characteristics over others as long as those charac-
210 Id. at 28.
211 Id.
212 See, e.g., Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1354 (4th Cir. 1995); Nedder v.
Rivier College, 908 F. Supp. 66, 75, n.8 (N.H. Dist. Ct. 1995).
213 See Francis v. City of Meridian, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1997).
214 See Nedder, 908 F. Supp. at 75, n.8.
215 See EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 441 (2006).
216 Cook, 10 F.3d at 23.
217 EEOC, 463 F.3d at 441.
218 Id. at 438-39.
219 See Cook, 10 F.3d at 23.
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teristics are not substantially-limiting disabilities.22 ° Similarly,
the Second Circuit in Francis v. City of Meriden held that "obesity,
except in special cases where the obesity relates to a physiologi-
cal disorder, is not a 'physical impairment' within the meaning
of the [ADA] statutes. ' 221 The physiological impairment re-
quirement also significantly limits "regarded as" obesity litiga-
tion, since an employer must have regarded the plaintiff as
suffering from a disability that is protected by the ADA.222 Thus,
an employer must regard the employee as having physiologi-
cally-caused obesity that substantially limits a major life activity
for an obesity "regarded as" claim to succeed-a highly specific,
and, frankly, unlikely circumstance. 2 3 Moreover, as obesity liti-
gation becomes more common, savvy defendants will likely ad-
mit that they did not want to hire a fat person; not because they
thought fat people could not do things other people could do,
but simply because they do not like fat people. A defendant
would have to bear the social stigma of such an admission, but
the ADA does not prohibit such open discrimination.
Comparing the CTA with the ADA's nondiscrimination lan-
guage side by side reveals another disconnect between the reali-
ties of obesity and U.S. anti-discrimination law. Canada's
Transportation Agency is empowered to take corrective mea-
sures whenever a person with a disability encounters an undue
transportation obstacle.22 4 Central to the IPIF holding was the
finding that the obstacle itself could be considered in determin-
ing whether a traveler had a disability and that there is no preset
definition of "obstacle. ' 225 In the ADA, the analogous language
to "obstacle" is a "substantial effect" on a "major life activity."
There has to be some trouble (obstacle) with a major life activity
before one can be considered disabled.226 Unfortunately for
obese passengers, there is a list of "major life activities," under
the ADA, and "traveling" is, so far, not one of them.227 Thus,
whatever special obstacles the obese may encounter when travel-
ing have no bearing on whether they are considered disabled
220 EEOC, 463 F.3d at 441.
22! Francis v. City of Meridian, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1997).
222 EEOC, 463 F.3d at 440.
223 See id.
224 Canada Transportation Act, R.S.C. Part V, 172(3) (1996).
225 McKay-Panos v. Air Canada, [2006] FCA 8, 1 37-40 (Can.).
226 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000 & Supp. V).
227 Coons v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir.
2004); Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs, Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir.
2004).
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under the ADA. This exclusion of travel-related obstacles seems
reminiscent of the Canadian Agency's formalistic 2002 McKay-
Panos holding. While excluding "travel" from the list of major
life activities does not place obese travelers in quite the same
catch-22,228 it does demonstrate an unwillingness to consider
special circumstances when judging the merits of ADA claims.
4. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008
Congress, evidently displeased with the strict interpretation
the courts have given the ADA, passed the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008 (the 2008 Amendments), broadening the scope of
who qualifies as a person with a disability. 229 Although the 2008
Amendments do broaden the ADA's scope of coverage, it is un-
clear whether they will have any effect on ADA obesity litigation.
The basic definition of disability as an impairment that "substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities" remains un-
changed,230 and the 2008 Amendments do not explicitly
overrule the cases requiring an underlying physiological cause
for obesity to be considered a disability. 23 1
The two most striking changes in the 2008 Amendments are
that: (1) there is no longer a need to consider the effect of miti-
gating measures when determining the presence of a disability
and (2) the language of what qualifies as a disability is to be
broadly construed. The first point explicitly overrules Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., eliminating the need to consider mitigat-
ing measures when determining the existence of a disability.232
Under Sutton, "corrected" disabilities were not protected by the
ADA.233 For example, a largely deaf person, whose hearing was
normal with a hearing aid may not have been considered dis-
abled, leaving a loophole allowing discrimination against people
with "corrected" disabilities. 234 The 2008 Amendments provide
a non-exhaustive list of corrective measures that are not to be
considered, including medication, medical supplies, equipment,
and prosthetic limbs. However, despite the pharmaceutical in-
dustry's best efforts, there is currently no effective "correction"
228 The ADA does not require the finding of an undue obstacle within the
transportation system.
229 42 U.S.C §§ 12101-03.
230 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
231 See 42 U.S.C §§ 12101-03.
232 42 U.S.C. § 12101, historical and statutory notes, (a)(4).
233 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
234 See id.
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for obesity,235 and little danger of anyone discriminating against
a previously-obese person who had taken corrective measures.
Thus, overruling Sutton does little to aid obese ADA litigants.
The 2008 amendments also explicitly overrule Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,236 which required a
strict interpretation of the phrases "substantially limits" and "ma-
jor life activities," creating "a demanding standard for qualifying
as disabled. ' 237 In stark contrast, the 2008 Amendments state
that "the definition of disability ... shall be construed in favor of
broad coverage . . . to the maximum extent permitted by the
terms of this chapter. ' 2 8 This language is likely the best hope
for ADA obesity litigation. Under a fresh reading of the statute,
it seems clear that extreme obesity may substantially limit a num-
ber of major life activities, such as walking or bending. Moreo-
ver, under such broad, inclusive language, it may be difficult to
justify the retention of the judicially engrafted underlying physi-
ological cause doctrine. On the other hand, nothing in the
2008 Amendments explicitly prohibits requiring some underly-
ing physiological cause for a disability. It seems quite possible
that the circuits may split on the issue, with conservative circuits
like the Fourth retaining the common law underlying physiolog-
ical cause doctrine, and more liberal circuits, like the Ninth, re-
jecting the pre-2008 Amendments common law and accepting
general obesity as a potential disability under a plain reading of
the statutory language.
It is unclear whether the ADA will now be an effective vehicle
to combat obesity discrimination, but under the 2008 Amend-
ments, it offers the most promise. The 2008 Amendments have
raised serious questions about the underlying physiological
cause doctrine, and have apparently reversed the historically re-
strictive judicial treatment of the ADA. However, as long as the
underlying physiological cause doctrine remains in effect, the
ADA is unlikely to effectively address obesity discrimination. In-
deed, there is persuasive evidence that obesity is largely a social
phenomenon related mostly to the obesity level of your peer
235 One may argue that proper nutrition and exercise may "correct" obesity,
but that does not seem to be the type of corrective measure the 2008 Amend-
ments speak to. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
236 42 U.S.C. § 12101, historical and statutory notes, (a)(5).
237 Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197
(2002).
238 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (A).
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group, rather than genetics or environmental factors.239 In a
study that spanned thirty-four years, researchers found that peo-
ple were 57% more likely to become obese if a friend became
obese, strongly suggesting a social component to the spread of
obesity,24 0 and leading some in the media to suggest that obesity
is "socially contagious. '241 However, given the broad language
in the 2008 Amendments, it may be that U.S. law will mirror the
Canadian rule, and that the cause of obesity will become irrele-
vant. Although the ADA is important in establishing the foun-
dation for general obesity anti-discrimination law, the airlines
are governed by the Air Carrier Access Act, which has its own
procedural difficulties.
C. THE AIR CARRIER ACCESS ACT
The Air Carrier Access Act was passed in 1986 to address the
difficulties experienced by disabled passengers during air
travel. 242 The nondiscrimination language of the ACAA closely
tracks the ADA, prohibiting foreign and domestic air-carriers
from discriminating against "otherwise qualified individuals"
who have a physical or mental impairment that substantially lim-
its one or more major life activities.24 3 Also like the ADA, the
ACAA allows "regarded as" suits, prohibiting discrimination
against anyone even believed by the carrier to have a disability.
Under the ACAA, an "otherwise qualified individual" is essen-
tially anyone who purchases a ticket, and presents himself for
travel.244 There is at least one court that has used ADA case law
to define "disability" in ACAA cases, although the ACAA differs
in that its implementing regulations 245 explicitly include tempo-
rary conditions as disabilities. 246
239 See Nicholas A. Christakis & James A. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large
Social Network over 32 Years, 357 N. ENG. J. MED. 370 (2007).
240 Id.
241 E.g., Science Daily, Obesity is 'Socially Contagious', SCIENCE DAILY, Jul. 26,
2007, available at http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/0 7 /0 7 0725175
419.htm.
242 See Anna Henning, OVERVIEW OF THE AIR CARRIER ACCESS ACT, CRS
RL34047, 2 n. 10 (2007), available at http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD
=A479371&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.
243 See Air Carrier Access Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2006).
244 Id.
245 14 CFR §382.5 (2006).
246 Henning, supra note 242, at n.212 (citing Curtis Edmonds, When Pigs Fly:
Litigation Under the [ACAA], 78 N.D. L. REv. 687, 698 (2002) (citing McIntyre v.
City & County of S.F., No. C-01-1244-CRB, 2001 WL 1679154, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
2001)).
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1. Obesity as a Disability Under the ACAA
On the merits, there seems to be greater hope of obesity dis-
crimination protections in the ACAA than in the ADA, particu-
larly if the changes in the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 are
incorporated into the judicial treatment of the ACAA. The in-
clusion of temporary disabilities in the ACAA cuts directly in
favor of the possibility of the inclusion of obesity as a disability.
The unspoken role that mutability plays in the "underlying phys-
iological cause" requirement in ADA litigation may thus be at-
tenuated in ACAA actions. Moreover, since the entire purpose
of the ACAA is to allow the disabled access to the airlines, courts
may be inclined to depart from the ADA's exclusion of "travel-
ing" as a major life activity. However, even if the ACAA does
accept traveling as a major life activity, there seems to be plenty
of room in the ACAA for judges to adopt an "underlying physio-
logical cause" requirement functionally identical to the ADA,
despite the ACAA's inclusion of temporarily disabling condi-
tions, as there are certainly "temporary" physiological condi-
tions. Moreover, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 does not
technically apply to the ACAA. However, perhaps the largest ob-
stacle to obesity discrimination actions against the airlines under
the ACAA is the ACAA's lack of a private cause of action.
2. No Private Cause of Action Under the ACAA
The most recent cases involving ACAA litigation have found
that there is no private cause of action in the ACAA.247 Al-
though the ACAA statutory language does not explicitly create
any private cause of action,248 earlier courts were willing to en-
graft not only an implied private cause of action onto the ACAA,
but compensatory and emotional distress damages as well. 249
Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., an Eighth Circuit case
from 1989, and Shinault v. American Airlines, Inc., a 1991 Fifth
Circuit case, both used a four-factor test to find an implied pri-
vate cause of action.2 0 The test, first promulgated by the U.S.
247 Boswell v. Skywest Airlines, Inc. 361 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2004); Love
v. Delta Airlines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1359 (11th Cir. 2002); Chipps v. Continental
Airlines, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:05-CV-2024, 2006 WL 463160, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 24,
2006).
248 Chipps, 2006 WL 463160, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2006) (citing Love, 310
F.3d at 1357).
249 Lynch, supra note 179, at 237-39.
250 Shinault v. American Airlines, Inc., 936 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1991); Tal-
larico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 881 F.2d 566, 568 (8th Cir. 1989).
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Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, lists the following factors to con-
sider: (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the class of per-
sons the statute was intended to benefit; (2) whether there is
any indication of the legislature's intent to create or deny an
implied private cause of action; (3) whether a private cause of
action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute;
and (4) whether creating an implied private cause of action in a
federal court would infringe on an area traditionally regulated
by state law.25 1 Both Tallarico and Shinault found that all four
factors were satisfied, and thus found that a private cause of ac-
tion did exist under the ACAA.252
In finding that Congress implicitly intended a private cause of
action, the Tallarico court found that the legal context sur-
rounding the ACAA supported the finding of a private cause of
action. The ACAA was patterned after the Rehabilitation Act,
and was actually enacted in response to a U.S. Supreme Court
holding that the Rehabilitation Act applied only to air carriers
that directly received federal funding. 253 The court reasoned
that since the Rehabilitation Act had been found to contain an
implied private cause of action, Congress implicitly intended the
ACAA to have an implied private cause of action as well. 254
However, the 2001 case, Alexander v. Sandoval, narrowed the
rules for finding an implied cause of action, focusing only on
congressional intent.255 The Court found that without congres-
sional intent to create a private cause of action, "a cause of ac-
tion does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter
how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compati-
ble with the statute. '256 The Sandoval Court went further to de-
clare that even the legal context in which the statute was passed
was unimportant, and that the investigation into the existence of
a private cause of action begins and ends within the text and
structure of the statute itself.257 Sandoval did not explicitly over-
rule Cort v. Ash, but did significantly narrow the types of infor-
mation that could be considered in determining congressional
intent.258
251 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
252 Shinault, 936 F.2d at 800; Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 570.
253 Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 570.
254 Id.
255 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-87.
256 Id.
2357 Id. at 288.
258 Id.
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Although neither Tallarico nor Shinault have been explicitly
overruled, the Third, Tenth and Eleventh circuits have all found
that applying the Sandoval text and structure test leads to a re-
jection of an ACAA private cause of action.259 Love v. Delta Air-
lines was the first post-Sandoval case to investigate a private
ACAA cause of action and subsequent holdings have followed its
form and result. Love recognized that both Tallarico and
Shinault found that a private cause of action did exist in the
ACAA, but insisted that under Sandoval, the broad-ranging un-
derlying purpose type of analysis conducted in both of those
cases is no longer appropriate.2 6 ° In conducting its analysis into
the text and structure of the ACAA, Love notes that the ACAA
provides an extensive framework for enforcement of the ACAA
provisions, but that the right for a private person to sue in fed-
eral district court is "notably absent. ' 261 Instead, the ACAA re-
quires individuals to file a complaint with the Department of
Transportation (DOT), which is required to investigate each
complaint.262 Moreover the ACAA explicitly includes a private
right for litigants to have administrative decisions reviewed in
federal appeals courts.263 Congress's explicit inclusion of a pri-
vate right of action for administrative review strongly persuaded
the Love court that Congress had not intended to include other
private rights of action.264
The lack of a private cause of action in the ACAA greatly de-
values the ACAA as a source of obesity discrimination protec-
tions. As discussed below, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) is unlikely to unilaterally declare obesity a disability, and
while individuals may appeal FAA decisions, the standard of re-
view for administrative decisions is highly deferential.265 Under
the Administrative Procedures Act, to set aside an agency action,
a court must find that the action was arbitrary and capricious, or
in some other way contrary to the law.266 As described exten-
sively above, there are a number of rational arguments the FAA
259 Boswell v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., 361 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2004); Love
v. Delta Airlines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1359 (lth Cir. 2002); Chipps v. Continental
Airlines, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:05-CV-2024, 2006 WL 463160, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 24,
2006).
26 Love, 310 F.3d at 1358-59.
261 Id. at 1354.
262 See 49 U.S.C. § 41705(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. V).
263 Love, 310 F.3d at 1356.
2-64 Id. at 1357.
265 See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (a) (2006).
266 Id.
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could use to support a finding that obesity is not a disability
under the ACAA, thus any hope for obesity protection under
the ACAA must rest in the unlikely event of the FAA itself hold-
ing that obesity is a disability.
The FAA is highly unlikely to declare obesity a disability under
the ACAA. The iPiF policy came from what is essentially the
Canadian version of the DOT (which includes the FAA), but
obesity discrimination does not appear to be on the FAA's radar.
The Obama administration has far more fundamental aspira-
tions for the FAA, such as finding a chief administrator, solving
the seemingly endless air-traffic controller labor disputes, and
obtaining permanent funding for the Agency. 267 Additionally,
the Obama administration's lofty goals for military, economic,
and social change will require an enormous amount of political
capital-capital he is unlikely to spend on a divisive and compar-
atively minor issue such as obesity disability. As far as the possi-
bility for some type of IPIF ruling from the FAA, the
implementing regulations may provide some insight. The regu-
lations flatly state that as far as seating accommodations are con-
cerned carriers "are not required to furnish more than one seat
per ticket or to provide a seat in a class of service other than the
one the passenger has purchased. 268 Of course, this is a regula-
tion, and not law, but under an arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard of review, it is unlikely to be successfully challenged.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the present legal and social framework, the United
States is highly unlikely to adopt anything resembling Canada's
1P1F rule. Indeed, U.S. law has a long way to go to even provide
basic discrimination protections for obese citizens. Title VII
provides no statutory protection for obese employees subject to
direct discrimination, 269 and has only the possibility of indirect
protection for disparate impact discrimination through the asso-
ciation between obesity, race, and gender.2 0 Likewise, the ADA
presently provides reasonably reliable protection only to individ-
uals whose obesity has been caused by a verifiable, underlying
267 Lisa Stark et al., Obama Taps LaHoodfor Transportation Secretary, ABC NEws,
Dec. 17, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Story?id=6199215&
page=1.
26 14 CFR §382.38 (2008).
269 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000 & Supp. V).
270 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 338-41 (1977).
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physiological condition. 271 The 2008 Amendments may offer
some relief for general obesity discrimination, but are currently
untested. Finally, the ACAA, perhaps the best hope for obese
passengers, is hamstrung by its lack of a private cause of action.
Only the FAA can enforce the ACAA provisions, and given the
current social and political landscape it seems unlikely that the
new administration and the beleaguered FAA will pursue the di-
visive issue of obesity-disability in the near future.
Of course, Congress could remedy the lack of statutory obes-
ity discrimination protection, but before we decide how we
might end obesity discrimination, we must decide as a society
whether we should end obesity discrimination. As politically incor-
rect as the question may be, the issue remains: is being over-
weight the type of characteristic we, as a society, wish to protect?
Do we elevate body-weight to the level of race and gender by
including it in the hallowed words of The Civil Rights Act of
1964? Do we give overweight Americans the same accommoda-
tions we give to those with muscular dystrophy or cancer by de-
fining obesity as a disability under the ADA or ACAA? There
would certainly be benefits of such a change. Bigotry is undesir-
able in any form, and including body-weight in the list of pro-
tected characteristics would help prevent much of the hardships
faced by millions of obese Americans. But America is full of un-
protected bigotry-against the ugly,27 2 against people with thick
regional accents, 27 against short men, 274 and so on. These char-
acteristics are difficult, if not impossible to alter, and are cer-
tainly involuntary, but none are legislatively protected. Should
we none the less protect obesity as we would race, or gender?
Given the current scientific understanding of obesity's social
etiology,275 the answer must be "no." For the most part, obesity
appears to be a symptom, not a disease. Undoubtedly, there are
diseases that cause obesity; for example, polycystic ovary syn-
271 See Francis v. City of Meridian, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1997).
272 Effects of Attractiveness Stereotypes on Assumed Characteristics of
Likeability, Intelligence and Honesty, http://www.angelfire.com/grrl/malibuse-
lina/papers/methodsl.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
273 UNT Inhouse Publications, Job Hirers Show Bias Against Regional Accents,
Study Suggests, UNT INHOUSE PUBLICATIONS, Aug. 4, 2000, available at http://www.
unt.edu/inhouse/august42000/accent.htm.
274 Jonathan Rauch, Short Guys Finish Last: Heightism, ECONOMIST, Dec. 23,
1995, available at http://www.shortsupport.org/News/0106.html.
275 See Christakis & Fowler, supra note 239.
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drome is related to obesity in many patients. 276 However, if
America's fascination with The Biggest Loser has shown us any-
thing, it is that even the most morbidly obese can lose astonish-
ing amounts of weight through diet and exercise. It may not be
easy to make such a radical change, but radically changing one's
lifestyle is rarely easy. If obesity is generally a lifestyle choice,
and not typically the result of an underlying physiological condi-
tion, why protect against obesity and not other socially stigma-
tized affectations, like dirty clothes, bad breath, or body odor?
If our scientific understanding of obesity changes, and obesity is
found to be truly uncontrollable in most cases, we may rethink
our laws and choose to give body weight the same protections
we afford to other ascribed characteristics. However, as long as
our true understanding of obesity is that, in the majority of
cases, it is a mutable and voluntary condition, we should not
support it with such lofty protections.
276 Women's Health Information, Signs of PCOS, http://www.womens-health.
co.uk/pcosl.asp. (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
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